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BOOK REVIEWS
ANATOMY OF THE WORLD. Michael Macdem. Minneapolis.
University of Minnesota Press, 1958. Pp. viii, 139. $3.50.
THE

This little book describes a debate that took place among English writers of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries over the structure of the earth and the
relationship between physical and moral law. The ideas considered are undoubtedly
now obsolete and they may appear to be of interest only to antiquaries. But the
ideas being traced in the book are the ideas that were in general currency at the
time of our own Revolution. These English writers had reached general agreement on the nature of man. It can be shown that their views were those held by
our founding fathers. Because these particular ideas are seldom discussed in histories of the period and because the ideas have real significance, this volume being
reviewed deserves close consideration.
It was part of the common knowledge of the men of the seventeenth century
that the sin of Adam and Eve had brought disorder and decay not only upon man
but also onto the hitherto perfect and incorruptible physical world. Massive volumes were devoted to both theological and empirical proofs of the earth's characteristics that demonstrated the validity of these beliefs. The irregularities of the
earth's surface, such as mountains, were taken as a clear sign of corruption. The
general belief was that mountains had appeared only after the Flood.
The new advances in astronomy in the early seventeenth century appeared to
support the view that the disorder extended to the heavens. Galileo's telescope
showed the irregularities on the surface of the moon. Kepler demonstrated that
the planets moved in elliptical orbits, not in the more perfect spherical movements.
It seemed clear that God had indeed cursed the earth and left it, as John Donne
said in 1611, with "all cohaerence gone."
The assumptions upon which this outlook was based began to be rejected in
the middle of the seventeenth century: Newton's discovery of the laws of motion
and of gravitation demonstrated that the entire physical universe was within a
framework of strict law. This law was taken to demonstrate the present interest of
God in the world. As such it made untenable any belief in the continuing decay
of the world. Mountains became not manifestations of worldly corruption but
majestic spectacles of the power of God. The issues of the debate now shifted to
man. If the natural world was not corrupt and in a state of decay, could it be
contended likewise of the moral world?
The opposing points of view can be exemplified by John Milton and Alexander Pope. In ParadiseLost, published in 1667, Milton told of man's first disobedience in eating the forbidden fruit and the awful consequences of that act. Less
than seventy years later, in 1733, Pope's Essay on Man' described a general order
of the universe which included both nature and man and which because of a complete interlacing of law proved that "whatever is, is right." In these years, evil
had ceased to be a consequence of sin and had become, what Dr. Macklem calls, a
1This essay and Addison's Spectator were the most widely read literary works in colonial
times. Rossiter, Seedtime of the Republic 126 (1953).
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condition of existence. If evil arises out of the natural operation of either the
physical world or human nature, it must simply be endured. We cannot change
nature's laws. They are conditions of existence. Existence cannot be wrong. That
has no meaning. Therefore whatever is, is right. The moral law as a command
arises from a belief that it expresses the will of God. The moral law will consist
merely of descriptive statements of fact if one believes that the moral law is but
part of the immutable structure of the universe. This latter belief was arrived at
early in the eighteenth century.
As astronomy and physics had revealed the natural laws governing the physical universe, so now the nature of man was investigated to derive the basis of the
moral law. The analogy was believed to be valid. Reason had discovered the way
the stars work. No obstacle was apparent that would bar the human mind from
understanding of the nature of man.
The use of human reason to discover moral law followed upon a then current
predisposition to dispense with a Deity. A starting point in this line of reasoning
is Thomas Hobbes' premise that the safety and preservation of each man is a law
of nature discoverable by reason. Hobbes, by discovering the laws of nature by
reason alone and deriving from them the moral law, was denying the will of God
as the ultimate basis of morality. He made law the command of the sovereign and
inferred that there was no necessary requirement that such commands be based on
justice. Hobbes' contemporaries doubted that reason could produce such a distasteful result. They argued that right reason which could discover the laws of
nature must be just because it was the will of God. This argument required the
belief that right reason originated in God's understanding and was sanctioned by
His will. But the eighteenth century pro tern. rejected the use of God for this sort
of argument. The debate now progressed by challenging the use of reason as a
sanction for moral law.
Understanding and willing are different functions. If reason were to discover
the law, from whence would come the obligation that it be obeyed? The ancient
answer had been that men should do the will of God, but that answer had been
put aside. Early in the eighteenth century, a plausible solution was worked out by
shifting study from a consideration of the sources of morality to an examination of
the moral agent. It was suggested that each man has within him a moral sense that
signals to him whether the contemplated act is morally right or wrong. Moral
law was thus naturally known by being implanted in the heart of each man. Moral
goodness was a quality that secured approbation for the actor. Or, as it soon
became, moral goodness was tested by the pleasure given by the act. It was inferred
that it was the natural desire of men to give pleasure to others. The function of
reason was limited to seeking out the appropriate means for doing virtuous acts.
The ends of human action, however, are naturally determined from within. Thus,
moral law simply described what gave satisfaction to either the actor or observer.
It did not command or oblige. Moral law and physical law are identical in nature.
They do not command that anything be or not be done. They describe what is.
Between the two, they encompass the universe. No thing can act contrary to them,
therefore, whatever is, is right.
This analytical study of an important segment of our intellectual history
should be of interest to us. When Thomas Hobbes used his reason to discover the
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nature of man and when he decided on self-interest as the foundation of moral law
and civil government, he helped to divert natural law from its classical basis in
divine law. The ultimate result was the natural rights philosophy which saw its
culmination in the French Revolution and against which Edmund Burke thundered.
The decision that not reason but the passions governed the moral nature of
man had an important part in the development of democracy in America. It could
be admitted that the natural endowment with respect to intelligence differed
markedly among men. The extent of education presented an even greater contrast. It seemed preferable, therefore, to leave the government in the hands of the
natural aristocracy of the rich and well-born. But such differences were irrelevant
if each man carried in his own heart the instinct or sense of what was right and
felt an impulse to do this right. Aware of this theory and believing in it, Jefferson
knew that the moral sense of men impelled them to desire the greatest good for
all other men. All men, of whatever station in life, could therefore be trusted with
government. Democracy was worth trying. The spread of education would make
a democracy even better.
There is, of course, no need to evaluate the ideas considered by Dr. Macklem.
They are of an historical period long gone, but cosmology is not a new science.
Perhaps some Englishmen in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries forgot St.
Thomas when they were seeking answers to the riddle of the universe. To men in
the twentieth century the riddle seems twenty times greater, and patterns are more
difficult to discover. St. Thomas can help us to find them.
STANLEY D. RosE*

William Q. de Funiak. 2d ed. Little,
Brown and Company, 1956. Pp. xii, 269. $5.00.
HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUITY.

Though the reviewers' had only light praise for the original edition of this
work, public response justified three printings 2 in the six years that passed before
the appearance of this second edition. The personal experience of this reviewer in
teaching Equity during the past four or five years bears testimony to the popularity
of the work among students. Possibly a re-examination of the book will shed light
on the secret of Professor deFuniak's success.
Undoubtedly, some of the work's popularity has come by default. Now that
the separate course in Equity has fallen by the way in most law schools, there is a
marked lack of interest in the preparation of new texts on Equity. One is tempted
to say that this and McClintock's hornbook are the only current American texts in
the field, although the recent edition of Clark's work might cause some to quarrel
with the statement. Be that as it may, this and the hornbook are the only current
works on American Equity which purport to treat in a more or less extensive
* Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
Book Reviews, E. A. Rauscher, 25 TULANE L. REv. 152 (1950), Burt DeRieux, 2
MERCER L. REv. 455 (1951), W. F. Young, 29 TEx. L. REV. 396 (1951).
2 See Preface to Second Edition at v.
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manner that phase of equity's jurisdiction which has expanded so much in this
century: jurisdiction in the tort field, particularly the protection of business and
personal rights. It is true that Walsh's text dealt with these matters but it is now
more than twenty-five years old and can hardly be considered up-to-date in this
developing field; both Pomeroy's treatise and Clark's text left these areas largely
undeveloped. DeFuniak's major contribution to the literature of equity lies in
chapters seven and eight of this book where he deals with and summarizes the
current thinking of American courts on the equitable protection of business and
rights incident thereto and the protection of personal or individual rights.
It would, however, be grossly unfair to state that all of the work's popularity
has come by default. Two features that endear any book on law to student and
practitioner alike-possibly teachers also, but there may well be doubt about thisare advertised in its title: 1) that this is a "handbook," a brief treatment of
fundamentals, and 2) that it deals primarily with "modern equity," i.e., current
cases and their application of equitable principles. That this is a handbook and
not a fully developed treatise is obvious from its size: only 242 pages of text.
That the author was principally concerned with modern equity is evident by the
vast number of recent citations found in the footnotes; indeed, it is remarkable,
and a tribute to the author's continuing research, how many of these citations are
post 1950-the date of the original edition of this book.
Though both of these qualities are commendable in any law book, they are
not prime requisites of a good text. Their value can only be assessed by determining what has been sacrificed to accomplish them. The author's basic tool in
accomplishing brevity has been the reduction of the subject matter to its barest
fundamentals. This of course is the method of every handbook. By and large
deFuniak has done a good job in this respect. Of course, in editing material, no
author could be expected to please everyone and there are times when deFuniak
has made me unhappy. The materials on rescission, reformation, and the equitable
remedies of contribution, subrogation, interpleader, quia timer, and bills of peace
are too short and superficial to be of much use; and the doctrine of equitable
servitudes has been completely ignored. However, the book does a good job of
presenting and summarizing the basic rules currently applied by courts in cases
involving the specific performance of contracts, equitable relief from torts, and
the more important effects of the doctrine of equitable conversion.
Successful though the book may be, it has its defects. Others have commented
upon the flowing style of the author and its tendency to lull the unwary into
believing that the difficult doctrines of equity are really quite simple. And others
have mentioned the wealth of secondary authorities (text, law review comment,
and annotations) cited in the footnotes-a boon to students with school libraries
at hand but not too helpful to practitioners whose library facilities are usually
more limited. My greatest objection to this book is that in his preoccupation with
modern cases and their application of equitable principles deFuniak has unduly
slighted the historical materials which show the function of equity in our law
and thereby aid in understanding its true nature.
Equity is not merely a series of rules to be learned by generalizing the outcome of past cases and applied more or less automatically to the facts of future
cases. Frequently equitable principles cannot be particularized into the form of
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concrete rules. Thus while wrestling with a case 3 involving the difficult doctrine
of mutuality, the Supreme Court of Kansas once summarized its conclusion:
"Manifestly it is just and equitable and will thwart a fraud now to decree
specific performance in the plaintiffs' favor, and manifestly it would be
unjust and inequitable and would allow the perpetration of a fraud not to do
so. That is sufficient. If scientific or other considerations demand a formula
governing the subject, whoever needs can phrase one on that basis."

It is true that rules make for certainty and predictability but, desirable though
these qualities may be, they are not the primary goal of the legal order. Governments are formed "to establish justice." Courts of equity were formed to secure
this ideal to litigants when the normal processes of the law failed. Courts of equity
and equitable principles have been the chief means of keeping this ideal of justice
for individual litigants in the forefront of our judicial system.
When the future of the separate equity course was being debated, Orfield
argued for its preservation lest "the ethical and discretionary flavor of equity will
be lost..." ' Now that the battle for the separate course has been lost in so many
schools, it seems more important than ever that authors of texts on equity stress
its nature and purpose and not content themselves with discussing merely the
modern applications of equitable principles. One of the easiest ways to accomplish
this is by giving more than cursory attention to the historical materials, by relating
the factors that necessitated the establishment of the separate court and pointing
up the many contributions the chancellors of the past have made to our legal
system. Concededly, this material must be condensed in a handbook. But I fear
that deFuniak's summary treatment of it "to the probable sacrifice of what may
constitute scholarliness" 5 will result in many students' finishing the work, knowing
the current applications of equitable principles but without perceiving the "spirit"
of equity.
JOHN L. GARVEY*

TRAFFIC VIC'nMs-Tort Law and Insurance. Leon Green.
western University Press. Pp. 128. $4.00.

North-

For thirty years Leon Green has been a tort lawyer's prophet. He has inspired
his students and his readers to an appreciation of the dynamics of the law. His
latest book is stamped with his style and his imagination. It is the story of
environments and their effects on judges who labor with doctrines in a practical
world. Dean Green begins his story with the nineteenth century, and he develops
it into the twentieth century and the automobile age.
In some respects the nineteenth century is the first chapter in the history of
negligence. Certainly it was the period of accelerated social conflicts, when judges
* Assistant Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.
8 Zelleken v. Lynch, 80 Kan. 746, 104 Pac. 563, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 659 (1909).
40rfield, The Place of Equity in the Law School Curriculum, 2 J. LEGAL ED. 26, 40
(1949).
5p. 2.
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began to expound consciously their doctrines on negligence and fault. But the
roots of negligence and master-servant go deeper than the nineteenth century.
Without those roots the story of torts in England and America could have been
more like the story in France after the Code Napoleon. Dean Green begins with
1800, perhaps the best beginning date for a small book, because that is when the
roots began to sprout.
Dean Green does not identify him, but sophisticated readers know that the
judgment-proof tortfeasor is the villain in the story. He is thedark horse who has
affected the caselaw trends in every decade. A civil suit for damages can be an
expensive kind of luxury. Poor men as plaintiffs could not afford to litigate until
lawyers devised the contingent fee, and poor men as defendants have never been
worth suing. Judges have talked much about doctrines. They have tried to be
objective, and they have been impartial. It is not to their discredit that they have
had to be practical. They have given us the kind of case law we have been able
to afford. Dean Green has described the shift from a defendant's to a plaintiff's
world, and he has supplied the key: caselaw trends have depended on risk shifting
through casualty insurance.
Three-fourths of the book is background for the remedial proposal, which
the Dean describes as loss insurance. The statement in the book is itself a summary which cannot be reduced effectively here. Dean Green proposes an absolute
liability scheme for automobile using, with compulsory insurance and administrative hearings under court supervision for the determination of damages according to common law measures. Perhaps under court supervision masters' findings on
damages can be confined by ceilings as verdicts were controlled by judges a
generation ago through remittitur, although Dean Green does not think big
verdicts now add much to the problem.
That there can be difficulties in effecting this program the author concedes.
Political action will be necessary in every state, and in the minds of many lawmen
political action like this would be revolutionary. However, conditions in the
personal injury field are such that remedial action cannot longer be postponed.
Something almost as drastic as Dean Green's scheme can be enacted without
scrapping trial by jury. Compulsory automobile liability insurance is the first step.
It is on its way now. Comparative negligence is practicable everywhere, and it will
not change trial routines essentially. But comparative negligence must be pitched
to the level of the Federal Employers Liability Act with complete joinder permitted by all parties coupled with contribution among all tortfeasors. All
personal injury settlements should be registered in an office of the clerk of court
and attorneys' fees should be identified. Dean Green asks for that as a part
of his proposal.
This book is challenging from several angles. The background is worth
reading for itself. The remedial proposal is the result of careful study by a
mature scholar with a practical touch. It is not for this reviewer to suggest
that the plan is too ambitious. Certainly he recognizes with the Dean that
some kind of decision day is coming soon.
VERNON X. MILLER*

Dean and Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America.

